We quantify the sensitivity of the Eisenberg-Noe clearing vector to estimation errors in the bilateral liabilities of a financial system in a stylized setting. The interbank liabilities matrix is a crucial input to the computation of the clearing vector. However, in practice central bankers and regulators must often estimate this matrix because complete information on bilateral liabilities is rarely available. As a result, the clearing vector may suffer from estimation errors in the liabilities matrix. We quantify the clearing vector's sensitivity to such estimation errors and show that its directional derivatives are, like the clearing vector itself, solutions of fixed point equations. We describe estimation errors utilizing a basis for the space of matrices representing permissible perturbations and derive analytical solutions to the maximal deviations of the Eisenberg-Noe clearing vector. This allows us to compute upper bounds for the worst case perturbations of the clearing vector in our simple setting. Moreover, we quantify the probability of observing clearing vector deviations of a certain magnitude, for uniformly or normally distributed errors in the relative liability matrix.
Introduction
Some important streams of the literature on contagion in networks has focused on interbank contagion, building on the network model of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) . Central banks and regulators have applied the model to study default cascades in their jurisdictions' banking systems. (Anand et al. (2014) , Ha laj and Kok (2015) , Boss et al. (2004) , Elsinger et al. (2013) , Upper (2011) , Gai et al. (2011) ). Hüser (2015) provides a comprehensive and detailed review of the interbank contagion literature. Hurd (2016) presents a unified mathematical framework for modeling these contagion channels. Recently, the Bank of England has extended this model to analyse solvency contagion in the UK financial system (Bardoscia et al. (2017) ). Multiple, extensions of this model have been developed to include effects such as
• Bankruptcy costs: Elsinger (2009), Rogers and Veraart (2013) , Elliott et al. (2014) , Glasserman and Young (2015) , Weber and Weske (2017) ,
• Cross-ownershi p: Elsinger (2009), Elliott et al. (2014) , Weber and Weske (2017) • Fire sales: Cifuentes et al. (2005) , Nier et al. (2007) , Gai and Kapadia (2010) , Chen et al. (2016) , Amini et al. (2016b,c) , Weber and Weske (2017) , Feinstein (2017a) , Feinstein and El-Masri (2017) , Feinstein (2017b) , Di Gangi et al. (2015) , and
• Multiple maturities: Capponi and Chen (2015) , Kusnetsov and Veraart (2016) , Banerjee et al. (2018) .
Moreover, a number of papers analyze the implications of network topology on systemic risk in greater detail. Amini et al. (2016a) derive rigorous asymptotic results for the magnitude of the default cascade in terms of network characteristics and find that institutions that have large connectivity and a high number of "contagious links" contribute most to contagion. Detering et al. (2016) show that if the degree distribution of the network does not have a second moment, local shocks can propagate through the entire network. This is relevant as realistic financial networks typically display a core-periphery structure with inhomogeneous degree distribution (Cont et al. (2013) ). Chong and Klüppelberg (2018) characterise the joint default distribution of a financial system for all possible network structures and show how Bayesian network theory can be applied to detect contagious channels.
Regulators have identified the inclusion of such contagion mechanisms in stress tests as a key priority (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015), Anderson (2016) ). Furthermore, recent research illustrates that accounting for feedback effects and contagion can change the pass/fail result in stress tests for individual institutions (Cont and Schaanning (2017) ).
A key ingredient required to estimate contagion in these models is the so-called liabilities matrix L, where L ij is the nominal liability of bank i to bank j. Often, the exact bilateral exposures are not known and thus need to be estimated (Ha laj and Kok (2013) , Anand et al. (2015) , Elsinger et al. (2013) , Ha laj and Kok (2015) ). Despite considerable efforts after the crisis to improve data collection, data gaps have not been closed yet. Beyond logistical issues like the standardization of reporting formats and the creation of unique and universal institution identifiers, further hurdles remain, such as legal restrictions that limit regulators' access only to data pertinent to their respective jurisdictions. Therefore, the estimation of specific bilateral exposures remains an important issue (Langfield et al. (2014) , Anand et al. (2015 , 2017 ), Financial Stability Board and International Monetary Fund (2015 ). The early literature often used entropy maximizing techniques to "fill in the blanks" in the liabilities matrix given the total assets and liabilities of banks (viz. the row and column sums of L). However, a growing empirical literature has shown that real-world interbank networks look quite different from the homogeneous networks that are obtained with such techniques (Bech and Atalay (2010) , Mistrulli (2011) , Cont et al. (2013) , Soramäki et al. (2007) ). A recent Bayesian method to estimate the bilateral liabilities, given the total liabilities and potential other prior information, is proposed in Gandy and Veraart (2016) and applied to reconstruct CDS markets in Gandy and Veraart (2017) . In particular, Mistrulli (2011) , Gandy and Veraart (2016) show how wide estimates of systemic risk may fluctuate when estimating contagion on real-world and heterogeneous networks versus uniform networks. This highlights the pivotal role that the matrix of bilateral exposures plays in quantifying the extent of contagion when computing default cascades. Beyond the above-mentioned legal hurdles that restrict regulator's access to data outside their jurisdiction, another important example of uncertainty in the interbank exposures arises due to time gaps between data collection and the run of the stress test: For some regulatory stress tests (e.g. Dodd-Frank stress tests) data is collected annually, which can both give rise to windowdressing behaviour by banks, as well as exposures naturally changing over time. In this case the existence or non-existence of an exposure between two banks will be known, and the uncertainty mainly surrounds its magnitude. Capponi et al. (2016) studies the effects of the network topology on systemic risk through the use of majorization-based tools. To the best of our knowledge, Liu and Staum (2010) is so far the only paper that performs a sensitivity analysis of the Eisenberg-Noe model. Their analysis focuses on the sensitivity of the clearing vector with respect to the initial net worth of each bank.
The main contribution of this paper is to perform a detailed sensitivity analysis of the clearing vector with respect to the interbank liabilities in the standard Eisenberg-Noe framework. To this end, we define directional derivatives of order k of the clearing vector with respect to "perturbation matrices," which quantify the estimation errors in the relative liability matrix. This allows us to derive an exact Taylor series for the clearing vector. Moreover, we introduce a set of "basis matrices," which specify a notion of fundamental directions for the directional derivative. We demonstrate that the directional derivative of the clearing vector can be written as a linear combination of these basis matrices. We proceed to use this result to study two optimisation problems that quantify the maximal deviation of the clearing vector from its "true" value, and obtain explicit solutions for both problems. These analytical results additionally provide an upper bound to the (first-order) worst case perturbation error in our stylized setting. We extend these results by computing the probability of observing deviations of a given magnitude when the estimation errors are either uniformly or normally distributed.
Finally, we illustrate our results both in a small four-bank network and using a dataset of European banks. Our results suggest that, though the set of defaulting banks may remain stable across different bilateral interbank networks (calibrated to the same data set), the deviation of the clearing vector from perturbations in the relative liabilities can be large. While our stylized setting ignores other extensions of the Eisenberg-Noe framework (such as bankruptcy costs or fire sales for instance), it provides a first step towards quantifying the sensitivity of the clearing vector to the liabilities matrix, which has not been addressed in the literature before.
In this paper, we occasionally consider external liabilities along with the interbank liabilities. We aggregate all external liabilities into a single external "societal firm." This additional "bank" is a stand-in for the entirety of the economy that is not included in the financial network. This is discussed in more details in, e.g., Glasserman and Young (2015) . In particular, as utilized in , the impact on the wealth of the societal firm can be used as an aggregate measure for the health of the financial network as a whole. We will make use of the societal firm in a similar way in order to study the effects of estimation errors in the interbank liabilities on external stakeholders.
We have limited the literature review mainly to papers that are close to the Eisenberg-Noe methodology. Needless to say, since the financial crisis a vast number of papers have been written on measuring systemic risk, using different approaches such as Agent-Based Modeling (Bookstaber et al. (2014) ), Econometry (Brownlees and Engle (2016) ), Mean-Field Games (Carmona et al. (2015) ) or Economic analysis (Brunnermeier and Cheridito (2014) , Hellwig (2009) ). Axiomatic measures of systemic risk and set-theory approaches have been developed in (Chen et al. (2013) , Kromer et al. (2016) , Biagini et al. (2015) , ). Bisias et al. (2012) , Fouque and Langsam (2013) and Duffie (2010) provide broad overviews of this vast literature.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the Eisenberg-Noe framework and provide initial continuity results of that model. We then study directional derivatives and the Taylor series of the Eisenberg-Noe clearing payments with respect to the relative liabilities matrix. These results allow us to consider the sensitivity of the clearing payments. In Section 3 we use the directional derivatives in order to determine the perturbations to the relative liabilities matrix that present the "worst" errors in terms of misspecification of the clearing payments and impact to society. These results are extended to also consider the probability of the various estimation errors. In Section 4 we implement our sensitivity analysis on data calibrated to a network of European banks. Section 5 concludes with a summary and a discussion of the limitations of our approach. Technical proofs are mostly relegated to the appendix which also provides details on the orthogonal basis of perturbation matrices.
Sensitivity analysis of Eisenberg-Noe clearing vector
We consider a financial system consisting of n banks, N = {1, . . . , n}. For i, j ∈ N , L ij ≥ 0 is the nominal liability of bank i to bank j. 1 Equivalently, L ij is the exposure of bank j to bank i. L ∈ R n×n is called the liabilities matrix of the financial network, and we assume that no bank has an exposure to itself, i.e., L ii = 0 for all i ∈ N . The total liability of bank i is given bȳ
We allow π ij ∈ [0, 1] to be arbitrary whenp i = 0 and only require n j=1 π ij = 1. 2 We denote the relative liability matrix Π ∈ R n×n . Any relative liability matrix Π must belong to the set of admissible matrices Π n , defined as the set of all right stochastic matrices with entries in [0, 1] and all diagonal entries 0:
Finally, denote the external assets of bank i from outside the banking system by x i ≥ 0. A bank balance sheet then takes the simplified form of Table 1 , and a financial system is given by the triplet (Π, x,p) ∈ Π n × R n + × R n + . A bank is solvent when the sum of its net external assets and performing interbank assets exceeds its total liabilities. In this case, the bank honours all of its obligations. However, if the value of its obligations is greater than the bank's net assets plus performing interbank assets, then 1 External liabilities can be considered as well through the introduction of an "external" bank 0. This is discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.
2 Note that the arbitrary choice of πij in the casepi = 0 has no impact on the outcome of the Eisenberg-Noe model since the transpose of the relative liability matrix Π is multiplied by the incoming payment vector p(Π), whose j th entry is 0 whenpj = 0 (cf. (2)).
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Interbank Table 1 : Stylized bank balance sheet the bank will default and repay its obligations pro-rata. 3 These rules yield a clearing vector as the solution of the fixed point problem
Let p : Π n → R n + ; Π → p(Π) be the fixed point function with parameters (x,p). As proved in (Eisenberg and Noe 2001, Theorem 2) , the clearing vector is unique if a system of banks is regular. Regularity is defined as follows: A surplus set S ⊆ N is a set of banks in which no bank in the set has any obligations to a bank outside of the set and the sum over all banks' external net asset values in the set is positive, i.e., ∀ (i, j) ∈ S × S c : π ij = 0 and i∈S x i > 0. Next, consider the financial system as a directed graph in which there is a directed link from bank i to bank j if L ij > 0. Denote the risk orbit of bank i as o(i) = {j ∈ N | there exists a directed path from i to j}. This means that the risk orbit of bank i is the set of all banks which may be affected by the default of bank i. A system is regular if every risk orbit is a surplus set. Uniqueness of the clearing vector has important consequences in terms of the continuity of the function p, which in turn is important for our sensitivity analysis. For this reason we will proceed under the assumption that our financial system is regular.
Proposition 2.1. Consider a regular financial system (Π, x,p) in which x andp are fixed. The function p, defined via (2), is continuous with respect to Π ∈ Π n .
We finish these preliminary notes by considering a simple example of the Eisenberg-Noe clearing payments under a system of n = 4 banks. We will return to this example throughout as a simple illustrative case study. Figure 1(a) . Assume the banks' external assets are given by the vector x = (0, 2, 2, 2) . With 0 net worth and positive liabilities, Bank 1 defaults initially. The Eisenberg-Noe clearing vector (2) can be easily computed to be p = (4. 5, 7.5, 3, 3) , showing that Bank 2 also defaults through contagion. The realized interbank payments are shown in Figure 1 (b) . Banks who are in default are colored red and payments that are repaid less than whole are also colored red. The edge widths are proportional to the payment size. 
Quantifying estimation errors from the (relative) liabilities matrices
We assume that some estimation error is attached to the entries of the relative liability matrix, leading to a deviation of the clearing vector from the "true" clearing vector p(Π). Denote the true relative liabilities matrix by Π and let Π + h∆ denote the liabilities matrix that includes some estimation error, for a perturbation matrix ∆ and size h ∈ R. First we consider the class of perturbation matrices, ∆ n (Π), under which we assume that the existence or non-existence of a link between two banks is known to the regulator and hence, the error is limited to a misspecification of the size of that link. In practice, this type of uncertainty arises when data is collected at a low frequency, which can lead to exposure evolving naturally, as well as banks trying to improve their balance sheet composition ahead of regulatory reporting dates. 4 Remark 2.9, Corollary 3.2 and Corollary 3.17 will utilize the results in this section to provide bounds for the perturbation error in general without predetermining existence or non-existence of links.
Definition 2.3. For a fixedp ∈ R n + , define the set of relative liability perturbation matrices by
The summation conditions ensure that the total liabilities and total assets, respectively, of each bank are left unchanged by the perturbation. Of course it is not possible to have Π + h∆ ∈ Π n for any h ∈ R. Throughout this work we consider perturbation magnitudes in a bounded interval, h ∈ (−h * , h * ), where
for any ∆ ∈ ∆ n (Π) to assure Π + h∆ ∈ Π n . We exclude from this calculation of h * any bank i wherep i = 0 since this has no impact on the results. It is natural to consider directional derivatives on a unit-ball, whence we focus on the bounded set of perturbations
where · F is the Frobenius norm, i.e.,
Remark 2.4. A more general case can be considered in which one allows for errors that create links where there were none or remove connections where there was one. This set is defined as follows: For a fixedp ∈ R n + ,
We will consider in particular the bounded set of perturbations
Such perturbations thus allow a "rewiring" of the network. In general, allowing edges to be added or deleted increases the potential error in the clearing vector. However, the infinitesimal nature of the sensitivity analysis necessarily restricts the rewiring to the creation of new links; any strictly positive liability cannot be deleted through an infinitesimal perturbation. We discuss this issue in more detail in Corollary 3.2, where we apply our methodology to the complete network, as well as in Figure 11 (a), which shows a distribution of payouts to society under a rewiring of the interbank network.
Directional derivatives of the Eisenberg-Noe clearing vector
Next, we analyse the error when using the clearing vector of a perturbed liability matrix, p(Π+h∆), instead of the clearing vector of the original liability matrix, p(Π), for small perturbations h∆, with ∆ ∈ ∆ n (Π).
Definition 2.5. Let ∆ ∈ ∆ n (Π). In the case that the following limit exists, we define the directional derivative of the clearing vector p(Π) in the direction of a perturbation matrix ∆ as
The first order Taylor expansion of p about Π gives
The following theorem provides an explicit formula for the directional derivative of the clearing vector for a fixed financial network.
Theorem 2.6. Let (Π, x,p) be a regular financial system. The directional derivative of the clearing vector p(Π) in the direction of a perturbation matrix ∆ ∈ ∆ n (Π) exists almost everywhere and is given by
where diag(d) is the diagonal matrix defined as diag(d 1 , . . . , d n ), where
Here, (3) holds outside of the measure-zero set {x ∈ R n + | ∃i ∈ N s.t. x i + n j=1 π ji p j (Π) =p i } in which some bank is exactly at the brink of default.
The term (I − diag(d)Π ) −1 also appears in Chen et al. (2016) , which the authors call the "network multiplier." This multiplier appears in the dual formulation of the linear program characterising the Eisenberg-Noe clearing vector, where the authors introduce it to study the sensitivities of the clearing vector with respect to the capital (of defaulting banks) and the total liabilities (of non-defaulting banks). The computation of the directional derivative above can be viewed as a generalisation of this result to arbitrary perturbations. The interpretation remains the same in our case: The "network multiplier" describes how an estimation error propagates through the network.
A Taylor series for the Eisenberg-Noe clearing payments
In the same manner, we can define higher order directional derivatives.
Definition 2.7. For k ≥ 1, we define the k th order directional derivative of the clearing vector with respect to a perturbation matrix ∆ as
when the limit exists, and
Remarkably, as Theorem 2.8 shows, all higher order derivatives also have an explicit formula, which allows us to obtain an exact Taylor series for the clearing vector. We impose an additional assumption on allowable perturbations h∆ so that the matrix diag(d) (as defined in Theorem 2.6) as a function of Π + h∆ is fixed with respect to h, i.e., we require h sufficiently small so that the same subset of banks is in default when the liability matrix is Π + h∆ as when the liability matrix is Π. Let
We necessarily have h * * > 0 because we exclude the measure-zero set {x ∈ R n + | ∃i ∈ N s.t. x i + n j=1 π ji p j (Π) =p i } in which a bank is exactly at the brink of default.
Theorem 2.8. Let (Π, x,p) be a regular financial system. Then for ∆ ∈ ∆ n (Π), and for all k ≥ 1: where
Moreover, for h ∈ (−h * * , h * * ), the Taylor series
converges and has the following representation
outside of the measure-zero set {x ∈ R n + | ∃i ∈ N s.t.
Comparing the directional derivative (3) to the full Taylor series (7) allows us to make the interpretation of the "network multiplier" more precise: The network multiplier captures the first order effect of the error propagation in the final "round " of the fictitious default algorithm. The k th order effect of the error propagation is captured by the network multiplier raised to the k th power. Finally, the Taylor series of the fixed-point is the infinite series of these k th order network multipliers; as this is of a similar form it can be interpreted as the multiplier of the network multiplier.
Remark 2.9. We can extend the Taylor series expansion results to the more general space of perturbation matrices ∆ n (Π) rather than ∆ n (Π). Over such a domain the Taylor series (8) is only guaranteed to converge for
as negative perturbations are not feasible.
Perturbation errors
In this section we study in detail estimation errors in an Eisenberg-Noe framework, relying on the directional derivatives discussed in the previous section. Specifically we calculate both maximal errors as well as the error distribution assuming a specific distribution of the mis-estimation of the interbank liabilities, notably uniform and Gaussian. We do this first in the original EisenbergNoe model, considering the Euclidean norm of the clearing vector as objective. Then we turn to an enhanced model that includes an additional node representing society and study the effect of estimation errors on the payout to society.
Deviations of the clearing vector
We concentrate first on the L 2 -deviation of the actual clearing vector from the estimated one.
Largest shift of the clearing vector
We return to the first order directional derivative to quantify the largest shift of the clearing vector for estimation errors in the relative liability matrix given by perturbations in ∆ n (Π). Let ∆ ∈ ∆ n (Π) and assume that for a given h ∈ R : Π + h∆ ∈ Π n . Then, the worst case estimation error under ∆ n (Π) is given as
In order to remove the dependence on h and the magnitude of ∆, we consider instead the bounded set of directions ∆ n F (Π) and infintesimal perturbations,
In this section, we call D ∆ p(Π) 2 2 the estimation error and max
. Because ∆ appears via a linear term in (3), this allows us to use a basis of perturbation matrices in an elegant way to quantify the deviation of the Eisenberg-Noe clearing vector under the space of perturbations ∆ n F (Π). Throughout the following results we will take advantage of an orthonormal basis E(Π) = (E 1 , . . . , E d ) of the space ∆ n (Π). More details of this space are given in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 3.1. Let (Π, x,p) be a regular financial system. The worst case first order estimation error under ∆ n F (Π) is given by
for any choice of basis E(Π) where · o 2 denotes the spectral norm of a matrix. Furthermore, the largest shift of the clearing vector is achieved by
where z k are the components of the (normalised) eigenvector corresponding to the maximum eigen-
Proof. Note first that any perturbation matrix ∆ ∈ ∆ n (Π) can be written as a linear combination of basic perturbation matrices, i.e., ∆ =
Immediately this implies, denoting the largest eigenvalue of a matrix A by λ max (A),
Finally, the independence of the solution from the choice of basis E(Π) is a direct result of Proposition A.3.
Hence, if the true liability matrix were perturbed in the direction of ∆ * (Π), this would generate the largest first order estimation error in the clearing vector. By error, we mean the Euclidean distance between the "true" clearing vector in the standard Eisenberg-Noe framework, and the clearing vector under the perturbed liabilities matrix. This is in general not equivalent to the direction that would change the default set most rapidly. Moreover, if regulatory expert judgement allowed to estimate reasonable absolute perturbations, our infinitesimal methodology could be used iteratively in a greedy approach until such an absolute estimation error was reached.
We can use this result on the maximum deviations of the clearing vector under ∆ n F (Π) in order to provide bounds of the worst case perturbation error without predetermining the existence or non-existence of links.
Corollary 3.2. Let (Π, x,p) be a regular financial system. The worst case first order estimation error under all perturbations is bounded by
for any choice of orthonormal bases E(Π) as above and E(Π C ) of any completely connected network Π C . In the case that Π itself is a completely connected network then this upper bound is attained.
Proof. For all Π and all completely connected networks Π C , we have
where E(Π C ) := (E 1 , . . . , E d ) is an orthonormal basis of the space ∆ n (Π C ). As in Proposition 3.1, the independence of the solution from the choice of basis E(Π C ) is a direct result of Proposition A.3. As this network is complete, this is furthermore a solution to both optimization problems (9) and (10) for the worst case perturbation. Additionally, the upper bound in Corollary 3.2 is attained. This perturbation is depicted in Figure 3 . As before, banks who are in default are colored red. The edges are labeled with the perturbation of the respective link between banks that achieves this greatest estimation error. The edge linking one node to another is red if the greatest estimation error under the set of perturbations ∆ n F (Π) occurs when we have overestimated the value of this link and green if we have underestimated it. Note that due to the symmetry of the optimal estimation error problem, −∆ * (Π) is also optimal and thus the interpretation of red and green links in Figure  3 can be reversed. Indeed, when studying the deviation of the clearing vector, the solutions ∆ * (Π) and −∆ * (Π) are equivalent. When analysing the shortfall of payments to society in Section 3.2, this will be no longer the case. Edge widths are proportional to the absolute value of the entries in ∆ * (Π). Though our Taylor expansion results (Theorem 2.8) are provided for h ∈ (−h * * , h * * ) only, the strict inequality is only necessary if h * * denotes the perturbation size at which a new bank defaults, not when a connection is removed. So when h = h * * ≈ 0.688, we obtain (4.11, 6.11, 3, 3) .
One can immediately verify that L * has indeed the same total interbank assets and liabilities for each bank, but they are distributed in a different manner. Hence, in this example, there can be a deviation of up to 15% in the relative norm of the clearing vector for a network that is still consistent with the total assets and total liabilities.
Remark 3.5. It may be desirable to normalize the first order estimation errors by, e.g., the clearing payments or total nominal liabilities, rather than considering the absolute error. In a general form, let A ∈ R n×n denote a normalization matrix (e.g., 
for any completely connected network Π C . Similarly the distribution results presented below can be generalized by considering 
Clearing vector deviation for uniformly distributed estimation errors
In this section, we will extend the above analysis to the case when estimation errors are uniformly distributed. This is done by considering the linear coefficients z for the basis of perturbation matrices to be chosen uniformly on the d-dimensional Euclidean unit ball.
Proposition 3.6. Let (Π, x,p) be a regular financial system. The distribution of the estimation error when the perturbations are uniformly distributed in the L 2 -unit ball is given by
where Λ is the diagonal matrix with elements given by the eigenvalues of
for any choice of orthonormal basis E(Π), vol denotes the volume operator, and Γ is the gamma function.
Proof. Let z be uniform on the d-dimensional unit ball. Then ∆ = d k=1 z k E k is a perturbation matrix. One obtains
is diagonalizable because it is real and symmetric. Therefore we can write
where Λ is a diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues and V is orthonormal. Combining the above equations, we have
Then since z is uniform on the unit ball and V V = I, w = V z is also uniform on the unit ball and thus we have
As in Proposition 3.1, the independence of the distribution from the choice of basis E(Π C ) is a direct result of Proposition A.3.
Remark 3.7. In the case where
In the case that min k λ k < α < max k λ k , the probability P D ∆ p(Π) 2 2 ≤ α can be given via the volume formula provided in Proposition 3.6 as d nested integrals,
Example 3.8. We return again to Example 2.2 to consider perturbations ∆ sampled from the uniform distribution. Figure 4 shows the density and CDF estimation for the relative estimation error, D ∆ p(Π) 2 2 / p(Π) 2 2 , corresponding to our stylized four-bank network. The probabilities are estimated from 100,000 simulated uniform perturbations.
Clearing vector deviation for normally distributed estimation errors
We extend our analysis from the previous subsection by considering normally distributed perturbations. To do so, we consider the linear coefficients z for the basis of perturbation matrices to be chosen distributed according to the standard d-dimensional multivariate standard Gaussian distribution. Then Proposition 3.9. Let (Π, x,p) be a regular financial system. The distribution of estimation errors where the perturbations are distributed with respect to the standard normal is given by the moment generating function
for any orthonormal basis E(Π). 
, under uniform perturbations ∆ as described in Example 3.8
Proof. Let z be a d-dimensional standard normal Gaussian random variable. Then ∆ = d k=1 z k E k is a perturbation matrix. As in Proposition 3.6, we can write
where Λ is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of D E(Π) p(Π) D E(Π) p(Π) and V is orthonormal.
Since z ∼ N (0, I) and V V = I, we have w = V z ∼ N (0, V V = I). Therefore,
Then y = Λ 1/2 w ∼ N (0, Λ) and so each component y k ∼ N (0, λ k ) and the y k 's are independent. Therefore
The distribution of y 2 k is Γ(1/2, 2λ k ), and thus the sum d k=1 y 2 k has the moment generating function
where λ k are the eigenvalues of D E(Π) p(Π) D E(Π) p(Π). As in Proposition 3.1, the independence of the distribution from the choice of basis E(Π C ) is a direct result of Proposition A.3.
Remark 3.10. A closed form for the density of the distribution found in Proposition 3.9 is given in equation (7) of Mathai (1982) . 
, under standard Gaussian perturbations ∆ as described in Example 3.11.
Example 3.11. We return again to Example 2.2 to consider perturbations ∆ sampled from the standard normal distribution. Figure 5 shows the density and CDF estimation for the relative estimation error, D ∆ p(Π) 2 2 / p(Π) 2 2 , corresponding to our stylized four-bank network. The probabilities are estimated from 100,000 simulated Gaussian perturbations.
Impact to the payout to society
In this section, we assume that in addition to their interbank liabilities, banks also have a liability to society. Here, society is used as totum pro parte, encompassing all non-financial counterparties, corporate, individual or governmental. Hence, the set of institutions becomes N 0 = {0} ∪ N . Without loss of generality, we assume that all banks i ∈ N owe money to at least one counterparty j ∈ N 0 within the system. Otherwise, a bank who owes no money can be absorbed by the society node as it plays the same role within the model structure. The question of interest is then how the payout to society may be mis-estimated (and in particular overestimated) given estimation errors in the relative liabilities matrix. This setting has been studied in, e.g., Glasserman and Young (2016) with the introduction of outside liabilities. We adopt their framework to analyze this question.
The interbank liability matrix L of the previous section is expanded to L 0 ∈ R (n+1)×(n+1) given by
where l 0 = L 10 , · · · , L n0 is the society liability vector. We require that at least one bank has an obligation to society, i.e., L i0 > 0 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The total liability of bank i is now given bȳ p i = n j=0 L ij . As stated above, we also require that each bank owes to at least one counterparty within the system (possibly society), i.e.,p i > 0 for all i ∈ N . The relative liability matrix Π 0 is transformed accordingly, i.e., π ij ∈ [0, 1] and π ij = L ij p i . An admissible relative liability matrix Π 0 thus belongs to the set of all right stochastic matrices with entries in [0, 1], all diagonal entries 0, and at least one π i0 > 0:
An admissible interbank relative liability matrix Π thus belongs to the set
which has the same properties as the original interbank relative liability matrix Π n defined in (1), except that row sums are smaller or equal to 1, with at least one strictly smaller than 1.
The following result is implicitly used in the subsequent sections. This provides us with the ability to, e.g., consider the directional derivative with respect to the payments made by the n financial firms without considering the societal node (which is equal to 0 by assumption).
Proof. This follows immediately from
where π 0 = π 10 , · · · , π n0 and d 0 is the vector of default indicators (of length n + 1 to include the societal node). In particular, since det(I − diag(d 0 )Π 0 ) = 0 (as shown in the proof of Theorem 2.6), we can conclude that det I − diag(d)Π = 0. Example 3.13. We include now a society node into our example from Section 2. The nominal interbank liabilities and liabilities from each bank to society are shown in Figure 6 (a). Note that at least one bank has an obligation to society and the society does not owe to any bank. As above, the banks' external assets are given by the vector x = (0, 2, 2, 2) . The clearing payments, or the amount of its obligations that each bank is able to repay, is given in Figure 6 (b). Banks who are in default are colored red, as are the liabilities that are not repaid in full.
Largest reduction in the payout to society
Next, we use the directional derivative in order to quantify how estimation errors, under ∆ n F (Π) in the interbank relative liability matrix, could lead to an overestimation of the payout to society. As it turns out, this problem also has an elegant solution using the basis of perturbation matrices discussed in Appendix A.2. We assume that (Π 0 , x,p) is a regular financial system and additionally that both the relative liabilities to society π 0 = (π 10 , ..., π n0 ) and the total liabilitiesp are exactly known.
Definition 3.14. Let (Π 0 , x,p) be a regular financial system. The payout to society is defined as the quantity π 0 p(Π) where p(Π) is the clearing vector of the n firms. Herein we consider the relative liabilities matrix Π 0 to be an estimation of the true relative liabilities. We thus consider the perturbations of the estimated clearing vectors to determine the maximum amount that the payout to society may be overestimated. To study the optimisation problem of minimizing the payout to society, we assume that at least one bank, but not all banks, default. The following proposition shows that this assumption excludes only trivial cases.
Proposition 3.15. Let (Π 0 , x,p) be a regular system with the interbank relative liability matrix Π ∈ Π n I and ∆ ∈ ∆ n (Π). If all banks default, or if no bank defaults, then the payout to society remains unchanged for an arbitrary admissible perturbation ∆.
Proof. Let ∆ be an arbitrary perturbation matrix. We show that in both cases π 0 D ∆ p(Π) = 0.
Assume that no bank defaults. Then diag(d) = 0, and the result holds as
Note that π 0 I − Π −1 = 1 , because by definition π 0 = 1 I − Π . Using this and the
Let ∆ ∈ ∆ n (Π) and assume that for a given h ∈ R : Π + h∆ ∈ Π n I . Then, the minimum payout to society is min
In order to remove the dependence on h and the magnitude of ∆, we subtract the constant term π 0 p(Π) and consider instead
As in Section 3.1.1, using the basis of perturbation matrices E(Π) of ∆ n (Π) (see Appendix A.2), we can compute the shortfall to society due to perturbations in the relative liability matrix in ∆ n F (Π).
Proposition 3.16. Let (Π 0 , x,p) be a regular financial system. The largest shortfall in payments to society due to estimation errors in the liability matrix in ∆ n F (Π) is given by
Furthermore, the largest shortfall to society is achieved by
Additionally, both the largest shortfall and the perturbation matrix that attains that shortfall are independent of the chosen basis E(Π).
Proof. Since the problem
has a linear objective, it is equivalent to
By the necessary Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we know that any solution to this problem must satisfy
. Plugging this into the second
. With two possible solutions we plug these back into the original objective to find that the minimum is attained at µ =
for an optimal value of:
Therefore, the solution is
By Proposition A.4, this result is independent of the choice of basis matrices.
Corollary 3.17. Let (Π 0 , x,p) be a regular financial system. The worst case shortfall to society is bounded by
where E(Π C ) is any orthonormal basis of perturbation matrices of any completely connected network Π C . In the case that Π itself is a completely connected network then this upper bound is attained. This perturbation is depicted in Figure 7 . Each edge is labeled with the perturbation of the respective link between banks that achieves this greatest reduction in payout to society. As before, banks who are in default are colored red. The edge linking one node to another is red if the greatest reduction in payout occurs when we have overestimated the value of this link and green if, in the worst case under ∆ n F (Π), we have underestimated the value of this link. Edge widths are proportional to the absolute value of the entries in ∆ * 0 (Π). In contrast to Example 3.4, note that −∆ * 0 (Π) is not a solution anymore. As this network is complete, this also equals the worst case shortfall of −1.4513, which is nearly 32% of the entire estimated payment to society.
Shortfall to society for uniformly distributed estimation errors
In this section we compute the reduction in the payout to society when the perturbations are uniformly distributed. To do so, we consider the linear coefficients z for the basis of perturbation matrices to be chosen uniformly from the d-dimensional Euclidean unit ball. Then ∆ = d k=1 z k E k is a perturbation matrix.
Proposition 3.19. Let (Π 0 , x,p) be a regular financial system. The distribution of changes in payments to society where the perturbations are uniformly distributed on the unit ball is given by Furthermore, this distribution holds for any choice of basis matrices E(Π).
Proof. Let z be a uniform random variable on the unit ball in R d centered at the origin. Then ∆ = d k=1 z k E k is a perturbation matrix. Note that by linearity of the directional derivative, we have
where
Since z is uniform on the unit ball,
, where I θ (a, b) is the regularized incomplete beta function (see, e.g., (DLMF, Chapter 8.17)) and 
, under uniform perturbations ∆ as described in Example 3.20
(2))). The final result follows from properties of the regularized incomplete beta function (see, e.g., (DLMF, Chapter 8.17)), i.e.,
, and noting that the case for α positive and negative can be written under the same equation using the standard hypergeometric function. The independence of this result to the choice of orthonormal basis E(Π) follows as in Proposition 3.16 as the distribution only depends on the basis E(Π) through the norm D E(Π) p(Π) π 0 2 .
Example 3.20. We return to Example 3.13 and consider perturbations ∆ sampled from the uniform distribution. The left and right panels of Figure 8 show the density and the CDF respectively for the relative reduction in society payout under uniformly distributed errors in our stylized four-bank network. Figure 9 (a) shows both the largest reduction and increase in the payout to society as well as various confidence intervals for the change in the payout as a function of the perturbation size, h. As h * and h * * depend on the choice of perturbation matrix ∆, we present the confidence intervals on an extrapolated interval for h ∈ [0, 1].
Shortfall to society for normally distributed estimation errors
We will now consider the same problem as above under the assumptions that the errors follow a standard normal distribution. As in Section 3.1.3, we note that the magnitude of the perturbations is no longer bounded by 1 in this setting. , where perturbations ∆ are sampled uniformly (left) and from the standard Gaussian distribution (right) for the stylized four-bank system with society as described in Example 3.13.
Proposition 3.21. Let (Π 0 , x,p) be a regular financial system. The distribution of changes to payments to society where the perturbations follow a multivariate standard normal distribution is given by
Furthermore, this distribution holds for any choice of basis matrices E(Π).
Proof. Let z be a d-dimensional standard normal Gaussian random variable. The result follows immediately by linearity and affine transformations of the multivariate Gaussian distribution. The independence of this result to the choice of orthonormal basis E(Π) follows as in Proposition 3.16 as the distribution only depends on the basis E(Π) through the norm D E(Π) p(Π) π 0 2 . Example 3.22. We return once more to Example 3.13 to consider perturbations ∆ sampled from the standard normal distribution. Figure 9 (b) shows various confidence intervals for the relative change in payout to society under normally distributed errors under ∆ 4 (Π), as a function of the perturbation size, h. As h * and h * * depend on the choice of perturbation matrix ∆ we present the confidence intervals on an extrapolated interval for h ∈ [0, 1].
2011 of European banks from the European Banking Authority that has been used in previous studies relying on the Eisenberg-Noe framework (Gandy and Veraart (2016) , Chen et al. (2016) ). As in these papers, given the heuristic approach to the dataset, our exercise should be considered to be an illustration of our results and methodology, rather than a realistic full-fledged empirical analysis.
With respect to the model's data requirements, the EBA dataset only provides information on the total assets T A i , the capital c i and a proxy for interbank exposures, a IB i . To populate the remaining key variables of the Eisenberg-Noe model, we therefore first assume, as in Chen et al. (2016) , that for each bank the interbank liabilities are equal to the interbank assets. Furthermore, we assume that all non-interbank assets are external assets, and the non-interbank liabilities are liabilities to a society sink-node. Hence,
Consequently, the Eisenberg-Noe model variables are
Note that each bank's net worth hence exactly corresponds to the book value of equity, or the banks' capitals:
The final key ingredient to the model is the (relative) liabilities matrix. This is usually highly confidential data, and is not provided in the EBA data set. In Gandy and Veraart (2016) , Gandy and Veraart propose an elegant Bayesian sampling methodology to generate individual interbank liabilities, given information on the total interbank liabilities and total interbank assets of each bank. The authors have developed an R-package called "systemicrisk" that implements a Gibbs sampler to generate samples from this conditional distribution. As our analysis requires an initial liability matrix, we use the European Banking Authority (EBA) data as input to their code in order to generate such a liability matrix. As suggested by (Gandy and Veraart 2016, Section 5. 3), we perturb the interbank liabilities l IB i slightly (such that they are not exactly equal to the interbank assets, while keeping the total sums equal) to fulfill the condition that L be connected along rows and columns. We then run their algorithm, with parameters p = 0.5, thinning = 10 4 , n burn−in = 10 9 , λ =
, to create one realisation of a 87 × 87 network of banks from the data. (We needed to exclude banks DE029, LU45 and SI058 because the mapping of the data to the model as described above created violations of the conditions for the algorithm and resulted in an error message.)
For simplicity and to consider an extreme event that would trigger a systemic crisis in the European banking system, we analyze what might have happened if Greece had defaulted on its debt and exited the Eurozone. We study this shock by decreasing the external assets of each bank by its individual Greek exposures, i.e. setting Greek bond values to zero. The histogram of Greek exposures (as a percentage of total exposures), displayed in Figure 10 (a), shows a large heterogeneity of exposures, with the majority of banks having no (or negligible) exposures to Greece, but a small number of Greek banks having substantial exposures to Greece (between 64% -96% of total assets). In our sensitivity analysis we resample the underlying liabilities matrix from the Gandy & Veraart algorithm Gandy and Veraart (2016) 1000 times. In each of our 1000 simulated networks considered there were 9 specific institutions that default on their debts in the Eisenberg-Noe framework; in only 3 simulated networks (0.3% of all simulations) there were between 1 and 3 additional banks that fail. As such, the traditional analysis of sensitivity of the Eisenberg-Noe framework would conclude that this contagion model is robust to errors in the relative liabilities matrix. This is consistent with the work of, e.g., Glasserman and Young (2015) .
However, we now consider the maximal deviation in both the estimation errors and the payments to society in each of our 1000 simulated networks under ∆ e 0 (Π) . We also depict the upper bound of the worst case perturbation errors for each of the 1000 simulated networks.
Notably in Figure 11 (a) we see that the shape of the network, calibrated to the same EBA data set, can vastly change the impact that the worst case estimation error has under perturbations in ∆ n F (Π). In this plot of the empirical densities, we see the range of normalized worst case first order estimation errors range from 0 to nearly 4×10 −4 . That is a 0 to 2% normed deviation of the clearing payments (while the value of p(Π) 2 itself has only minor variations: a total range of under 27 million EUR compared to its norm of near 5 trillion EUR for the different simulated networks Π). The upper bound on these perturbation errors (for the norm rather than norm squared) is approximately 2%, and as can be seen in Figure 11 (a), the range of obtained upper bounds is very small. This indicates that such a bound is rather insensitive to the initial relative liability matrix Π. Therefore any such computed upper bound is of value to a regulator, even if the initial estimate of the relative liabilities Π is incorrect.
When we consider instead Figure 11 (b) we see that the density is more bell shaped, again with a large variation from the least change (roughly −0.001) to the most change (roughly −0.007) in the normalized impact to society; this proves as with Figure 11 (a) that the underlying network can provide large differences in the apparent stability of a simulation to validation. While these values may appear small, the 10 −3 arises from normalising the deviation of the clearing vector with the value of the societal node but still amounts to a variation on the order of 23.2 -162.4 billion EUR. Thus this sensitivity is as if entire banks' assets vanished from the wealth of society. The upper bound of these perturbation errors is approximately twice as high as the obtained maximal deviations computed under ∆ n F (Π). Notably, the median upper bound of the worst case error is nearly equal to the minimum possible value, though with a skinny tail reaching off to greater errors. Finally, Figures 11(c) and 11(d) analyze the impact of network heterogeneity on the perturbation of the clearing vector. To this end, we quantify "network heterogeneity" as the variance of the degree distribution of out-edges. It varies between 110 to 170 in the 1000 simulated networks, thus displaying a reasonable level of heterogeneity. Figure 11 
Conclusion
In this paper we analyse the sensitivity of clearing payments in the standard Eisenberg-Noe framework to misspecification or estimation errors in the relative liabilities matrix. We accomplish this by determining the directional derivative of the clearing payments with respect to the relative liabilities matrix. We extend this result to consider the full Taylor expansion of the fixed points to determine the clearing payments as a closed-form perturbation of an initial solution.
We further study worst case and probabilistic interpretations of our perturbation analysis. In this simple setting, our results provide an upper bound on the largest shift for the clearing vector as well as a lower bound for the shortfall to society. In a numerical case study of the European banking system, we demonstrate that, even when the set of defaulting firms remains constant, the clearing payments and wealth of society can be greatly impacted. This is true even in the case that the existence and non-existence of links is pre-specified. When the existence and non-existence of links is unknown, then the upper bound of the errors can be utilized which generally provides errors that are significantly less sensitive to the initial estimate of the relative liabilities and roughly twice as large as the errors under pre-specification of links.
Our sensitivity analysis is based on the standard Eisenberg-Noe model. As such, it omits a number of other important extensions that have been developed in the literature (such as bankruptcy costs, fire sales, or the impact of the network topology). For a full quantification of risk and uncertainty, future research will therefore need to develop a model that combines -and weighsall of these relevant channels of contagion. Nevertheless, our results provide a first step towards quantifying the impact of estimation errors in the interbank liability matrix and thereby improving tools for systemic risk analysis.
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, where
The function φ is jointly continuous with respect to the payment vectorp and the relative liabilities π ij for i, j ∈ N . Because the system is regular and thus has a unique fixed point, it follows from (Feinstein et al. 2017, Proposition A.2 ) that the graph
By (Feinstein et al. 2017, Proposition A. 3), Ψ is a closed mapping in the product topology. Then, in order to show that p is continuous, take U ⊂ [0,p] closed. Then
The graph of p is closed and Π n is closed by definition. Hence p −1 [U ] is closed and the function p is continuous with respect to Π.
Proof of Theorem 2.6 We note that our proof does not assume a priori that the clearing vector p is differentiable; we comment on this simpler case below.
Proof. We assume that the net external assets lie in the set
By continuity of p with respect to Π (Proposition 2.1) we have for all i ∈ N , α 
To prove the existence of D ∆ p(Π), we will show that the following two limits,
h and
are equal for each component. Consider the upper limit
for some function Ψ : R n → R n . Similarly, we get
Hence, both D ∆ p(Π) and D ∆ p(Π) are fixed points of the same mapping Ψ. Assuming that this fixed point problem has a unique solution it follows
for all i ∈ N . Therefore, under this assumption, D ∆ p(Π) is well defined and it is the solution to the fixed point equation
Next, we proceed to show that I − diag(d)Π is invertible, which establishes uniqueness of the fixed point and the directional derivative (3) to conclude the proof. First, assume that diag(d)Π is irreducible, i.e., the graph with adjacency matrix diag(d)Π has directed paths in both directions between any two vertices i = j. Then by the Perron-Frobenius Theorem (see, e.g., (Gentle 2007, Section 8.7 .2)), diag(d)Π has an eigenvector v > 0 corresponding to eigenvalue ρ(diag(d)Π ), where ρ(·) is the spectral radius of a matrix. As eigenvectors are only unique up to a multiplicative constant, we may assume v 1 = 1. Under the assumption of a regular system, at least one bank must be solvent, i.e., there exists some i such that diag(d) ii = 0. This implies that there exists a column such that the column sum of diag(d)Π is strictly less than 1. In fact, any insolvent institution j with obligations to bank i will have column sum of diag(d)Π strictly less than 1. If all banks are solvent, diag(d) is the zero matrix and the result is trivial. Thus there is some matrix M ≥ 0, M = 0 so that each column sum of diag(d)Π + M is 1, i.e.
Note that the column sums of diag(d)Π are at most 1 since each row sum of Π is 1. Therefore the spectral radius of diag(d)Π must be less than or equal to 1. Moreover, we must have ρ(diag(d)Π ) < 1. Otherwise, ρ(diag(d)Π ) = 1, which along with the scaling of the eigenvector so that v 1 = 1 implies 1 = 1 v = 1 diag(d)Π + M v = 1 (v + M v) = 1 + 1 M v > 1, as Π v = 1v by the definition of eigenvalues. Therefore, we can conclude that, in the case diag(d)Π is irreducible, ρ(diag(d)Π ) < 1. Now suppose that diag(d)Π is reducible, i.e., diag(d)Π is similar to a block upper triangular matrix D, with irreducible diagonal blocks D i , i = 1, . . . , m for some m < n. Under the assumption of a regular system, each D i has at least one column whose sum is strictly less than 1. As in the preceding case, this implies that ρ(D i ) < 1 for each i and therefore
Since the maximal eigenvalue of diag(d)Π is strictly less than 1, 0 cannot be an eigenvalue of I − diag(d)Π . This suffices to show that I − diag(d)Π is invertible.
Remark A.1. If one assumes that p is differentiable with respect to the relative liabilities Π, the result of Theorem 2.6 can be obtained directly from implicit differentiation of the representation
Proof of Theorem 2.8
Proof. We prove the result by induction. Theorem 2.6 shows the result for k = 1. We now assume that equation (6) holds for k and we proceed to show that it holds for k + 1. As in Theorem 2.6, we show the existence of (4) by computing the two limits:
The first order Taylor approximation for matrix inverses gives by the differentiation rules for the matrix inverse (cf. (Gentle 2007, p. 152) ) for X, Y ∈ R n×n and h small enough: (X + hY ) −1 ≈ X −1 − hX −1 Y X −1 . Applying this fact with X = I − diag(d)Π T and Y = −diag(d)∆ T , we have
Additionally, we note that the k th order derivative, similarly to all lower order derivatives, is continuous with respect to the relative liabilities matrix Π since (by assumption of the induction) D 
Similarly, we obtain D
∆ p(Π). The existence of the limit and the result (6) follow for all k ≥ 1.
With the above results on all k th order directional derivatives, we now consider the full Taylor expansion. First, by the definition of h * * given in (5), diag(d) is fixed for h ∈ (−h * * , h * * ). By the definition of the clearing payments p (given in (2)) and defaulting firms diag(d) (defined in Theorem 2.6), along with the fact that I − diag(d)(Π + h∆) is invertible (as shown in the proof of Theorem 2.6 since (Π + h∆, x,p) remains a regular system by h ∈ (−h * * , h * * ) ⊆ (−h * , h * )), we have p(Π + h∆) = diag(d) x + (Π + h∆) p(Π + h∆) + I − diag(d) p
Similarly we find that
By combining (13) and (14), we immediately find
Additionally, we can show that We will employ the following property of matrix inverses (see (Meyer 2000, p. 126) ): If X, Y ∈ R n×n so that X −1 exists and lim k→∞ (X −1 Y ) k = 0, then
We take X = I − diag ( , we have lim
using a property of the spectral radius (see (Meyer 2000, p. 617) ). Thus, by combining this result with (13), we have
The penultimate equality above follows directly from (14). The last equality follows directly from the definition of the k th order directional derivatives proven above. Thus we have shown the full Taylor expansion is exact on H ⊆ (−h * * , h * * ). Finally, since we have already shown that (8) is exact for any h ∈ (−h * * , h * * ) and
is singular for at least one of the elements h ∈ − . That is, H = (−h * * , h * * ).
